TY - JOUR
T1 - The Legislative Logic of Electoral Reform in Ukraine
AU - Thames, Frank C.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 University of Glasgow.
PY - 2017/4/21
Y1 - 2017/4/21
N2 - Since the end of Communist rule, Ukraine has undertaken three major electoral reforms, moving from a single-member district majoritarian system, to a mixed-member system, to a closed-list proportional representation system, and back to the mixed-member system. Some argue that political parties are primarily motivated by the desire to maximise seats or improve their ability to impact on policy. I argue that existing theories of electoral reform often assume that parties are unitary actors during electoral reform. My analysis of electoral reform in Ukraine clearly demonstrates significant intra-party dissonance on electoral system preferences. This result questions the usefulness of the party unity assumption.
AB - Since the end of Communist rule, Ukraine has undertaken three major electoral reforms, moving from a single-member district majoritarian system, to a mixed-member system, to a closed-list proportional representation system, and back to the mixed-member system. Some argue that political parties are primarily motivated by the desire to maximise seats or improve their ability to impact on policy. I argue that existing theories of electoral reform often assume that parties are unitary actors during electoral reform. My analysis of electoral reform in Ukraine clearly demonstrates significant intra-party dissonance on electoral system preferences. This result questions the usefulness of the party unity assumption.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85021054425&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/09668136.2017.1329403
DO - 10.1080/09668136.2017.1329403
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85021054425
SN - 0966-8136
VL - 69
SP - 614
EP - 641
JO - Europe - Asia Studies
JF - Europe - Asia Studies
IS - 4
ER -