TY - JOUR
T1 - The Influence of Partisanship, Ideology, and the Law on Redistricting Decisions in the Federal Courts
AU - McKenzie, Mark Jonathan
PY - 2012/12
Y1 - 2012/12
N2 - Redistricting cases offer a unique opportunity to test the effects of partisan favoritism in judging and to investigate when partisanship might influence decision making distinctly from ideology. How partisan are federal judges? In an analysis of federal district court cases from 1981 to 2007, this study finds that federal judges are neither neutral arbiters nor crass partisans. Instead, judging in redistricting cases can best be described in terms of constrained partisanship. When redistricting law is clear, judges eschew decision making that furthers their party's interests. However, where legal precedent is ambiguous, partisan favoritism exacts a strong influence on judicial behavior.
AB - Redistricting cases offer a unique opportunity to test the effects of partisan favoritism in judging and to investigate when partisanship might influence decision making distinctly from ideology. How partisan are federal judges? In an analysis of federal district court cases from 1981 to 2007, this study finds that federal judges are neither neutral arbiters nor crass partisans. Instead, judging in redistricting cases can best be described in terms of constrained partisanship. When redistricting law is clear, judges eschew decision making that furthers their party's interests. However, where legal precedent is ambiguous, partisan favoritism exacts a strong influence on judicial behavior.
KW - Redistricting
KW - federal district courts
KW - judicial behavior
KW - judicial decision making
KW - partisan favoritism
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84868616993&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1177/1065912911421012
DO - 10.1177/1065912911421012
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84868616993
SN - 1065-9129
VL - 65
SP - 799
EP - 813
JO - Political Research Quarterly
JF - Political Research Quarterly
IS - 4
ER -