The impact of accounting restatements on CFO turnover and bonus compensation: Does securities litigation matter?

Denton Collins, Austin L. Reitenga, Juan Manuel Sanchez

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

24 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper examines the association between accounting restatements, class-action securities litigation and chief financial officer (CFO) turnover and bonus compensation. We identify income-decreasing earnings restatements that were the result of aggressive accounting policies, and hypothesize that these restatements will result in higher CFO turnover rates, and lower bonus compensation, especially when the firm is the target of a restatement-related class-action securities lawsuit. Our results indicate that CFO turnover and bonus compensation are affected by restatements, but only when the restatement firm is the target of a class-action suit. When we expand the analyses to consider other types of executives (e.g., CEOs and COOs), we continue to find that turnover only occurs in the presence of a class-action suit. However, bonus compensation penalties to other types of executives are not limited to litigation-related restatements.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)162-171
Number of pages10
JournalAdvances in Accounting
Volume24
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2008

Keywords

  • Chief financial officers
  • Contracting penalties, Disciplinary actions
  • Earnings restatements
  • Executive compensation
  • Executive turnover

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