The Consequences of the US DOJ's Antitrust Activities: A Macroeconomic Perspective

Andrew Young; William F Shughart

The Consequences of the US DOJ's Antitrust Activities: A Macroeconomic Perspective

Andrew Young, William F Shughart

Free Market Institute

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Do the antitrust law enforcement activities of the US Department of Justice act as exogenous “technology shocks” or as “markup shocks” limiting market power and promoting economic growth? We analyze annual time series data from 1947 to 2003 on three measures of federal antitrust intervention: the ratio of the Antitrust Division’s budgetary expenditures to GDP as well as the numbers of civil and criminal antitrust cases instituted. We find that changes in the levels of these policy variables act like negative technology shocks and that the negative effects are transitory; antitrust policy generates no subsequent offsetting increases in productivity.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	409-422
Journal	Public Choice
State	Published - Mar 2010

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title = "The Consequences of the US DOJ's Antitrust Activities: A Macroeconomic Perspective",

abstract = "Do the antitrust law enforcement activities of the US Department of Justice act as exogenous “technology shocks” or as “markup shocks” limiting market power and promoting economic growth? We analyze annual time series data from 1947 to 2003 on three measures of federal antitrust intervention: the ratio of the Antitrust Division{\textquoteright}s budgetary expenditures to GDP as well as the numbers of civil and criminal antitrust cases instituted. We find that changes in the levels of these policy variables act like negative technology shocks and that the negative effects are transitory; antitrust policy generates no subsequent offsetting increases in productivity.",

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AB - Do the antitrust law enforcement activities of the US Department of Justice act as exogenous “technology shocks” or as “markup shocks” limiting market power and promoting economic growth? We analyze annual time series data from 1947 to 2003 on three measures of federal antitrust intervention: the ratio of the Antitrust Division’s budgetary expenditures to GDP as well as the numbers of civil and criminal antitrust cases instituted. We find that changes in the levels of these policy variables act like negative technology shocks and that the negative effects are transitory; antitrust policy generates no subsequent offsetting increases in productivity.

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