Strategic Voting and Insider Ownership

Blair B Marquardt, Brett Myers, Xu Niu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Manager incentives are viewed as being better aligned with those of shareholders when they have an ownership stake in the firms they manage. However, manager ownership can exacerbate agency problems by better enabling managers to pass shareholder resolutions. We outline a model of strategic shareholder voting that allows outside shareholders to mitigate the influence of insiders. Consistent with our model, we find empirical support for strategic voting by outside shareholders and that strategic voting is more apparent when management-sponsored proposals are controversial or complex, when votes are close, or when other agency risks are greater.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)50-71
JournalJournal of Corporate Finance
StatePublished - May 11 2018

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Strategic Voting and Insider Ownership'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this