TY - JOUR
T1 - Spinoza on causation and power
AU - Di Poppa, Francesca
PY - 2013/9
Y1 - 2013/9
N2 - The purpose of this paper is to argue that, for Spinoza, causation is a more fundamental relation than conceptual connection, and that, in fact, it explains conceptual connection. I will firstly offer a criticism of Michael Della Rocca's 2008 claims that, for Spinoza, causal relations are identical to relations of conceptual dependence and that existence is identical to conceivability. Secondly, I will argue that, for Spinoza, causation is more fundamental than conceptual dependence, offering textual evidence from both Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Ethics. In particular, I will offer an interpretation of the attributes as first and foremost causal activities, or powers: this interpretation has the advantage to clarify the role of 1D6 as a genetic definition.
AB - The purpose of this paper is to argue that, for Spinoza, causation is a more fundamental relation than conceptual connection, and that, in fact, it explains conceptual connection. I will firstly offer a criticism of Michael Della Rocca's 2008 claims that, for Spinoza, causal relations are identical to relations of conceptual dependence and that existence is identical to conceivability. Secondly, I will argue that, for Spinoza, causation is more fundamental than conceptual dependence, offering textual evidence from both Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Ethics. In particular, I will offer an interpretation of the attributes as first and foremost causal activities, or powers: this interpretation has the advantage to clarify the role of 1D6 as a genetic definition.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84884303101&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/sjp.12036
DO - 10.1111/sjp.12036
M3 - Review article
AN - SCOPUS:84884303101
VL - 51
SP - 297
EP - 319
JO - Southern Journal of Philosophy
JF - Southern Journal of Philosophy
SN - 0038-4283
IS - 3
ER -