TY - GEN
T1 - Security in mixed time and event triggered cyber-physical systems using moving target defense
AU - Potteiger, Bradley
AU - Cai, Feiyang
AU - Dubey, Abhishek
AU - Koutsoukos, Xenofon
AU - Zhang, Zhenkai
N1 - Funding Information:
cyber-attacks. VIII. Acknowl edgement s Thi s work is supported i n part by the Nati onal Securi ty Agency (H98230-18-D-0010), the National Science Foundation (CNS-1739328), and by NIST (70NANB18H198). Any opi ni ons, f i ndi ngs, and concl usi ons or r ecommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessari l y refl ect the vi ews of NSA, NSF, or NIST.
Funding Information:
This work is supported in part by the National Security Agency (H98230-18-D-0010)
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 IEEE.
PY - 2020/5
Y1 - 2020/5
N2 - Memory corruption attacks such as code injection, code reuse, and non-control data attacks have become widely popular for compromising safety-critical Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). Moving target defense (MTD) techniques such as instruction set randomization (ISR), address space randomization (ASR), and data space randomization (DSR) can be used to protect systems against such attacks. CPS often use time-Triggered architectures to guarantee predictable and reliable operation. MTD techniques can cause time delays with unpredictable behavior. To protect CPS against memory corruption attacks, MTD techniques can be implemented in a mixed time and event-Triggered architecture that provides capabilities for maintaining safety and availability during an attack. This paper presents a mixed time and event-Triggered MTD security approach based on the ARINC 653 architecture that provides predictable and reliable operation during normal operation and rapid detection and reconfiguration upon detection of attacks. We leverage a hardware-in-The-loop testbed and an advanced emergency braking system (AEBS) case study to show the effectiveness of our approach.
AB - Memory corruption attacks such as code injection, code reuse, and non-control data attacks have become widely popular for compromising safety-critical Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). Moving target defense (MTD) techniques such as instruction set randomization (ISR), address space randomization (ASR), and data space randomization (DSR) can be used to protect systems against such attacks. CPS often use time-Triggered architectures to guarantee predictable and reliable operation. MTD techniques can cause time delays with unpredictable behavior. To protect CPS against memory corruption attacks, MTD techniques can be implemented in a mixed time and event-Triggered architecture that provides capabilities for maintaining safety and availability during an attack. This paper presents a mixed time and event-Triggered MTD security approach based on the ARINC 653 architecture that provides predictable and reliable operation during normal operation and rapid detection and reconfiguration upon detection of attacks. We leverage a hardware-in-The-loop testbed and an advanced emergency braking system (AEBS) case study to show the effectiveness of our approach.
KW - Cyber-physical systems
KW - Event triggered
KW - Moving target defense
KW - Time triggered
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85088162575&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/ISORC49007.2020.00022
DO - 10.1109/ISORC49007.2020.00022
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85088162575
T3 - Proceedings - 2020 IEEE 23rd International Symposium on Real-Time Distributed Computing, ISORC 2020
SP - 89
EP - 97
BT - Proceedings - 2020 IEEE 23rd International Symposium on Real-Time Distributed Computing, ISORC 2020
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Y2 - 19 May 2020 through 21 May 2020
ER -