TY - GEN
T1 - Red Alert for Power Leakage
T2 - 16th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ASIA CCS 2021
AU - Zhang, Zhenkai
AU - Liang, Sisheng
AU - Yao, Fan
AU - Gao, Xing
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 ACM.
PY - 2021/5/24
Y1 - 2021/5/24
N2 - RAPL (Running Average Power Limit) is a hardware feature introduced by Intel to facilitate power management. Even though RAPL and its supporting software interfaces can benefit power management significantly, they are unfortunately designed without taking certain security issues into careful consideration. In this paper, we demonstrate that information leaked through RAPL-induced side channels can be exploited to mount realistic attacks. Specifically, we have constructed a new RAPL-based covert channel using a single AVX instruction, which can exfiltrate data across different boundaries (e.g., those established by containers in software or even CPUs in hardware); and, we have investigated the first RAPL-based website fingerprinting technique that can identify visited webpages with a high accuracy (up to 99% in the case of the regular network using a browser like Chrome or Safari, and up to 81% in the case of the anonymity network using Tor). These two studies form a preliminary examination into RAPL-imposed security implications. In addition, we discuss some possible countermeasures.
AB - RAPL (Running Average Power Limit) is a hardware feature introduced by Intel to facilitate power management. Even though RAPL and its supporting software interfaces can benefit power management significantly, they are unfortunately designed without taking certain security issues into careful consideration. In this paper, we demonstrate that information leaked through RAPL-induced side channels can be exploited to mount realistic attacks. Specifically, we have constructed a new RAPL-based covert channel using a single AVX instruction, which can exfiltrate data across different boundaries (e.g., those established by containers in software or even CPUs in hardware); and, we have investigated the first RAPL-based website fingerprinting technique that can identify visited webpages with a high accuracy (up to 99% in the case of the regular network using a browser like Chrome or Safari, and up to 81% in the case of the anonymity network using Tor). These two studies form a preliminary examination into RAPL-imposed security implications. In addition, we discuss some possible countermeasures.
KW - RAPL
KW - covert channel
KW - side-channel attack
KW - website fingerprinting
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85108086664&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/3433210.3437517
DO - 10.1145/3433210.3437517
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85108086664
T3 - ASIA CCS 2021 - Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security
SP - 162
EP - 175
BT - ASIA CCS 2021 - Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security
PB - Association for Computing Machinery, Inc
Y2 - 7 June 2021 through 11 June 2021
ER -