Post-Cameralist Governance: Towards a Robust Political Economy of Bureaucracy

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Abstract

I develop a robust political economy of bureaucracy by highlighting the conditions necessary for hierarchical administrative bodies to govern protectively and productively, but not predatorily. These conditions are residual claimancy and jurisdictional competition. I make this argument by exploring a post-cameralist interpretation of governance. Cameralism arose as a governance philosophy in the fractured principalities of seventeenth-century Germany following the Thirty Years' War. Post-cameralism focuses not on particular cameralist governance strategies but on a paradigm which sees governance as an activity provided within a larger exchange order, rather than imposing itself on that order as in more conventional treatments of public economics. While a post-cameralist conception of governance comes with its own challenges, such as tensions with normative visions that promote self-governance, it nonetheless presents an intriguing synthesis of monocentric and polycentric insights.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)294-308
Number of pages15
JournalEconomic Affairs
Volume36
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1 2016

Keywords

  • bureaucracy
  • cameralism
  • jurisdictional competition
  • polycentricity
  • post-cameralism
  • residual claimancy
  • robust political economy

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