Political property rights and governance outcomes: A theory of the corporate polity

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

8 Scopus citations

Abstract

I present a theory of political property rights that complements familiar Tiebout mechanisms in explaining governance outcomes. I argue that when the structure of political property rights is such that the polity most closely resembles a corporation, governance will be largely productive. In contrast, when the structure of political property rights is such that the polity is characterized by a tragedy of the commons, governance will be largely predatory and will promote rent seeking. I illustrate my theory with reference to two corporate-like polities, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates, as well as the literature on private city planning on urban development. I also discuss the assumptions to which my analysis is sensitive. I conclude by exploring possible future trends in governance in light of my theory.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-20
Number of pages20
JournalJournal of Private Enterprise
Volume31
Issue number4
StatePublished - Dec 1 2016

Keywords

  • Political property rights
  • Predatory governance
  • Private governance
  • Productive governance

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Political property rights and governance outcomes: A theory of the corporate polity'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this