TY - JOUR
T1 - Political Cleavages and Economic Sanctions
T2 - The Economic and Political Winners and Losers of Sanctions
AU - Lektzian, David
AU - Patterson, Dennis
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 International Studies Association.
PY - 2015/3/1
Y1 - 2015/3/1
N2 - We develop and test a theory, based on the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, of the effectiveness of sanctions. We treat sanctions as exogenously imposed changes in a country's exposure to international markets. In a country with an open-trade regime, owners and intensive users of the abundant factor of production hold economic and political power. In a country closed to trade, however, economic and political power rests with owners and intensive users of scarce factors. Thus, if real rates of return to the abundant factor decline during sanctions against a trade-open country, or real rates of return to the scarce factor decline during sanctions against a trade-closed country, we expect these economically and politically powerful segments of the targeted country to push hard for policy changes that would bring about an end to sanctions. Statistical analysis of sanctions episodes initiated between 1971 and 2000 provides support for the paper's expectations.
AB - We develop and test a theory, based on the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, of the effectiveness of sanctions. We treat sanctions as exogenously imposed changes in a country's exposure to international markets. In a country with an open-trade regime, owners and intensive users of the abundant factor of production hold economic and political power. In a country closed to trade, however, economic and political power rests with owners and intensive users of scarce factors. Thus, if real rates of return to the abundant factor decline during sanctions against a trade-open country, or real rates of return to the scarce factor decline during sanctions against a trade-closed country, we expect these economically and politically powerful segments of the targeted country to push hard for policy changes that would bring about an end to sanctions. Statistical analysis of sanctions episodes initiated between 1971 and 2000 provides support for the paper's expectations.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84924334853&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/isqu.12198
DO - 10.1111/isqu.12198
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84924334853
VL - 59
SP - 46
EP - 58
JO - International Studies Quarterly
JF - International Studies Quarterly
SN - 0020-8833
IS - 1
ER -