TY - JOUR
T1 - Learning to make better strategic decisions
AU - Cardella, Eric
N1 - Funding Information:
I would like to thank my dissertation advisor Martin Dufwenberg for helpful comments. I would also like to thank Anna Breman, David Butler, Tamar Kugler, Jörg Oechssler, John Wooders, an anonymous referee, and conference participants at the University of Arizona for additional helpful comments. I am grateful to the Economic Science Laboratory at the University of Arizona for providing financial support.
PY - 2012/9
Y1 - 2012/9
N2 - Strategic settings are often complex and agents who lack deep reasoning ability may initially fail to make optimal decisions. This paper experimentally investigates how the decision making quality of an agent's opponent impacts learning-by-doing (LBD) and learning-by-observing (LBO) in a 2-player strategic game. Specifically, does LBD become more effective when agents face an opponent who exhibits optimal decision making? Similarly, does LBO become more effective when agents observe an opponent who exhibits optimal decision making? I consider an experimental design that enables me to measure strategic decision making quality, and control the decision making quality of an agent's opponent. The results suggest that LBD is more effective when facing an optimal decision making opponent. Whereas, LBO is, at most, marginally more effective when observing an optimal decision making opponent. The results also suggest that LBD is at least as effective as LBO at improving decision making in the 2-player game considered.
AB - Strategic settings are often complex and agents who lack deep reasoning ability may initially fail to make optimal decisions. This paper experimentally investigates how the decision making quality of an agent's opponent impacts learning-by-doing (LBD) and learning-by-observing (LBO) in a 2-player strategic game. Specifically, does LBD become more effective when agents face an opponent who exhibits optimal decision making? Similarly, does LBO become more effective when agents observe an opponent who exhibits optimal decision making? I consider an experimental design that enables me to measure strategic decision making quality, and control the decision making quality of an agent's opponent. The results suggest that LBD is more effective when facing an optimal decision making opponent. Whereas, LBO is, at most, marginally more effective when observing an optimal decision making opponent. The results also suggest that LBD is at least as effective as LBO at improving decision making in the 2-player game considered.
KW - Dominant strategy
KW - Learning
KW - Learning-by-doing
KW - Learning-by-observing
KW - Strategic game
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84869505358&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.04.011
DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.04.011
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84869505358
VL - 84
SP - 382
EP - 392
JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
SN - 0167-2681
IS - 1
ER -