TY - JOUR
T1 - Equilibrium contracts in a bilateral monopoly with unequal bargaining powers
T2 - equilibrium contracts in a bilateral monopoly
AU - Dasgupta, Siddhartha
AU - Devadoss, Stephen
PY - 2002/3
Y1 - 2002/3
N2 - Real-world bilateral monopolies often indicate that one party exercises slightly Superior bargaining power than the other party. We analyze long-term, cooperative Contracts in bilateral monopolies with unequal bargaining powers. We assume that the Two parties bargain for a determinate price and quantity of the intermediate product by Optimizing a joint objective which takes into account the profits and bargaining power of Each party. We use a Bowley price leadership model to develop the multi-period Contracts and derive conditions that induce a Nash equilibrium at the jointly determined Points of operation. [C71, C78].
AB - Real-world bilateral monopolies often indicate that one party exercises slightly Superior bargaining power than the other party. We analyze long-term, cooperative Contracts in bilateral monopolies with unequal bargaining powers. We assume that the Two parties bargain for a determinate price and quantity of the intermediate product by Optimizing a joint objective which takes into account the profits and bargaining power of Each party. We use a Bowley price leadership model to develop the multi-period Contracts and derive conditions that induce a Nash equilibrium at the jointly determined Points of operation. [C71, C78].
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=80052160942&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/10168730200000003
DO - 10.1080/10168730200000003
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:80052160942
VL - 16
SP - 43
EP - 71
JO - International Economic Journal
JF - International Economic Journal
SN - 1016-8737
IS - 1
ER -