TY - JOUR
T1 - Emergent politics and constitutional drift
T2 - the fragility of procedural liberalism
AU - Salter, Alexander
AU - Furton, Glenn
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2018, Emerald Publishing Limited.
PY - 2018
Y1 - 2018
N2 - Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to integrate classical elite theory into theories of constitutional bargains. Design/methodology/approach: Qualitative methods/surveys/case studies. Findings: Open-ended constitutional entrepreneurship cannot be forestalled. Constitutional entrepreneurs will almost always be social elites. Research limitations/implications: The research yields a toolkit for analysing constitutional bargains. It needs to be used in historical settings to acquire greater empirical content. Need to be applied to concrete historical cases to do economic history. Right now it is still only institutionally contingent theory. Practical implications: Formal constitutions do not, and cannot, bind. Informal constitutions can, but they are continually evolving due to elite pressure group behaviors. Social implications: Liberalism needs another method to institutionalize itself! Originality/value: Open-ended nature of constitutional bargaining overlooked in orthodox institutional entrepreneurship/constitutional economics literature.
AB - Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to integrate classical elite theory into theories of constitutional bargains. Design/methodology/approach: Qualitative methods/surveys/case studies. Findings: Open-ended constitutional entrepreneurship cannot be forestalled. Constitutional entrepreneurs will almost always be social elites. Research limitations/implications: The research yields a toolkit for analysing constitutional bargains. It needs to be used in historical settings to acquire greater empirical content. Need to be applied to concrete historical cases to do economic history. Right now it is still only institutionally contingent theory. Practical implications: Formal constitutions do not, and cannot, bind. Informal constitutions can, but they are continually evolving due to elite pressure group behaviors. Social implications: Liberalism needs another method to institutionalize itself! Originality/value: Open-ended nature of constitutional bargaining overlooked in orthodox institutional entrepreneurship/constitutional economics literature.
KW - Constitutional bargain
KW - Elite theory
KW - Formal constitution
KW - Informal constitution
KW - Politics as exchange
KW - Procedural liberalism
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85044004755&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1108/JEPP-D-17-00016
DO - 10.1108/JEPP-D-17-00016
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85044004755
SN - 2045-2101
VL - 7
SP - 34
EP - 50
JO - Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy
JF - Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy
IS - 1
ER -