ELECTORAL POLITICS AND THE EXECUTIVE VETO: A PREDICTIVE THEORY

KEVIN B. GRIER; MICHAEL MCDONALD; ROBERT D. TOLLISON

doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1995.tb01872.x

ELECTORAL POLITICS AND THE EXECUTIVE VETO: A PREDICTIVE THEORY

KEVIN B. GRIER, MICHAEL MCDONALD, ROBERT D. TOLLISON

Free Market Institute

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Abstract

We argue that winner‐take‐all voting in states and the unequal distribution of electoral votes across states in presidential elections makes incumbent presidents rationally place more weight on the preferences of voters in closely contested, larger states when making policy decisions. This hypothesis is tested by examining whether presidential veto decisions are influenced by the floor votes of senators from these electorally crucial states. In a pooled sample of 325 individual bills from 1970 through 1988, we find significant evidence of this behavior by incumbent presidents.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	427-440
Number of pages	14
Journal	Economic Inquiry
Volume	33
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1995.tb01872.x
State	Published - Jul 1995

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ELECTORAL POLITICS AND THE EXECUTIVE VETO: A PREDICTIVE THEORY

Abstract

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