ELECTORAL POLITICS AND THE EXECUTIVE VETO: A PREDICTIVE THEORY

KEVIN B. GRIER, MICHAEL MCDONALD, ROBERT D. TOLLISON

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

27 Scopus citations

Abstract

We argue that winner‐take‐all voting in states and the unequal distribution of electoral votes across states in presidential elections makes incumbent presidents rationally place more weight on the preferences of voters in closely contested, larger states when making policy decisions. This hypothesis is tested by examining whether presidential veto decisions are influenced by the floor votes of senators from these electorally crucial states. In a pooled sample of 325 individual bills from 1970 through 1988, we find significant evidence of this behavior by incumbent presidents.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)427-440
Number of pages14
JournalEconomic Inquiry
Volume33
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 1995

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