Effect of monitor-subject cheap talk on ultimatum game offers

Jayson L. Lusk; Darren Hudson

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2003.01.004

Effect of monitor-subject cheap talk on ultimatum game offers

Jayson L. Lusk, Darren Hudson

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11 Scopus citations

Abstract

We explore the influence of experimental monitor cheap talk on offers in single-shot ultimatum bargaining games. We find that behavior more closely resembles Nash equilibrium predictions when subjects are provided information about the theoretical money maximizing solution in addition to information about why behavior may deviate from this equilibrium. Among other things, results suggest subjects fail to behave consistently with the Nash equilibrium prediction because of a lack of knowledge of the theoretical money maximizing solution or because of a lack of common expectations about the rationality and beliefs of other players.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	439-443
Number of pages	5
Journal	Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume	54
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2003.01.004
State	Published - Jul 2004

Keywords

Bounded rationality
Cheap talk
Experimental methods
Ultimatum games

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10.1016/j.jebo.2003.01.004

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title = "Effect of monitor-subject cheap talk on ultimatum game offers",

abstract = "We explore the influence of experimental monitor cheap talk on offers in single-shot ultimatum bargaining games. We find that behavior more closely resembles Nash equilibrium predictions when subjects are provided information about the theoretical money maximizing solution in addition to information about why behavior may deviate from this equilibrium. Among other things, results suggest subjects fail to behave consistently with the Nash equilibrium prediction because of a lack of knowledge of the theoretical money maximizing solution or because of a lack of common expectations about the rationality and beliefs of other players.",

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AB - We explore the influence of experimental monitor cheap talk on offers in single-shot ultimatum bargaining games. We find that behavior more closely resembles Nash equilibrium predictions when subjects are provided information about the theoretical money maximizing solution in addition to information about why behavior may deviate from this equilibrium. Among other things, results suggest subjects fail to behave consistently with the Nash equilibrium prediction because of a lack of knowledge of the theoretical money maximizing solution or because of a lack of common expectations about the rationality and beliefs of other players.

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KW - Cheap talk

KW - Experimental methods

KW - Ultimatum games

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ER -

Effect of monitor-subject cheap talk on ultimatum game offers

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Keywords

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