District magnitude, personal votes, and government expenditures

Martin S. Edwards; Frank C. Thames

doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2006.06.008

District magnitude, personal votes, and government expenditures

Martin S. Edwards, Frank C. Thames

Political Science

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

35 Scopus citations

Abstract

Previous research has that proportional-representation systems produce higher levels of government spending than do majoritarian systems. In some studies, scholars use district magnitude to reach this conclusion, showing a positive relationship between it and government expenditure. Yet, Carey and Shugart [1995: Electoral Studies 14, 417] argue that the effect of district magnitude on government expenditure is, in reality, conditioned on the level of incentives for personal voting in the electoral system. We find support for this hypothesis with an empirical analysis of government expenditure in 77 democracies between 1970 and 2000.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	338-345
Number of pages	8
Journal	Electoral Studies
Volume	26
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2006.06.008
State	Published - Jun 2007

Keywords

District magnitude
Fiscal policy
Government expenditure
Personal vote

Access to Document

10.1016/j.electstud.2006.06.008

Cite this

@article{9f09c037cbfe4b6991d7e8a260c63c6e,

title = "District magnitude, personal votes, and government expenditures",

abstract = "Previous research has that proportional-representation systems produce higher levels of government spending than do majoritarian systems. In some studies, scholars use district magnitude to reach this conclusion, showing a positive relationship between it and government expenditure. Yet, Carey and Shugart [1995: Electoral Studies 14, 417] argue that the effect of district magnitude on government expenditure is, in reality, conditioned on the level of incentives for personal voting in the electoral system. We find support for this hypothesis with an empirical analysis of government expenditure in 77 democracies between 1970 and 2000.",

keywords = "District magnitude, Fiscal policy, Government expenditure, Personal vote",

author = "Edwards, {Martin S.} and Thames, {Frank C.}",

note = "Funding Information: This research was sponsored with the help of a multidisciplinary seed grant from the Texas Tech University Office of Research Services. This paper could not have been written without the able and patient support of Shelli Keck, Eric Booth, and Marshall Garland, who assembled the dataset.",

year = "2007",

month = jun,

doi = "10.1016/j.electstud.2006.06.008",

language = "English",

volume = "26",

pages = "338--345",

journal = "Electoral Studies",

issn = "0261-3794",

number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - District magnitude, personal votes, and government expenditures

AU - Edwards, Martin S.

AU - Thames, Frank C.

N1 - Funding Information: This research was sponsored with the help of a multidisciplinary seed grant from the Texas Tech University Office of Research Services. This paper could not have been written without the able and patient support of Shelli Keck, Eric Booth, and Marshall Garland, who assembled the dataset.

PY - 2007/6

Y1 - 2007/6

N2 - Previous research has that proportional-representation systems produce higher levels of government spending than do majoritarian systems. In some studies, scholars use district magnitude to reach this conclusion, showing a positive relationship between it and government expenditure. Yet, Carey and Shugart [1995: Electoral Studies 14, 417] argue that the effect of district magnitude on government expenditure is, in reality, conditioned on the level of incentives for personal voting in the electoral system. We find support for this hypothesis with an empirical analysis of government expenditure in 77 democracies between 1970 and 2000.

AB - Previous research has that proportional-representation systems produce higher levels of government spending than do majoritarian systems. In some studies, scholars use district magnitude to reach this conclusion, showing a positive relationship between it and government expenditure. Yet, Carey and Shugart [1995: Electoral Studies 14, 417] argue that the effect of district magnitude on government expenditure is, in reality, conditioned on the level of incentives for personal voting in the electoral system. We find support for this hypothesis with an empirical analysis of government expenditure in 77 democracies between 1970 and 2000.

KW - District magnitude

KW - Fiscal policy

KW - Government expenditure

KW - Personal vote

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=34248178958&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.electstud.2006.06.008

DO - 10.1016/j.electstud.2006.06.008

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:34248178958

SN - 0261-3794

VL - 26

SP - 338

EP - 345

JO - Electoral Studies

JF - Electoral Studies

IS - 2

ER -

District magnitude, personal votes, and government expenditures

Abstract

Keywords

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this