Cournot and stackelberg equilibrium in mixed oligopoly models

Alvaro Eduardo Cordero Franco, Vyacheslav Kalashnikov, Mario G. Beruvides

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

This research investigates the Stackelberg mixed oligopoly model, where a state-owned public firm maximizing domestic social surplus and foreign firms compete. Comparisons of profits and domestic social surplus in the different Stackelberg games are done. Based in these comparisons the desirable role (either leader or follower) of each firm according to their optimal reaction at the Cournot equilibrium, either weak or strong, is evaluated. Also, results of the comparison of the domestic social surplus between different mixed oligopoly and domestic monopoly scenarios are presented. This theoretical development is presented to initiate a discussion on what constitutes the proper way to address the issue of "benefit to society" in mixed oligopolistic economies. Copyright

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication30th Annual National Conference of the American Society for Engineering Management 2009, ASEM 2009
Pages751-756
Number of pages6
StatePublished - 2009
Event30th Annual National Conference of the American Society for Engineering Management 2009, ASEM 2009 - Springfield, MO, United States
Duration: Oct 14 2009Oct 17 2009

Publication series

Name30th Annual National Conference of the American Society for Engineering Management 2009, ASEM 2009

Conference

Conference30th Annual National Conference of the American Society for Engineering Management 2009, ASEM 2009
CountryUnited States
CitySpringfield, MO
Period10/14/0910/17/09

Keywords

  • Cournot model
  • Domestic social surplus
  • Mixed oligopoly
  • Oligopoly
  • Stackelberg model

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