TY - JOUR
T1 - Corruption and voter turnout
T2 - A spatial econometric approach
AU - Lacombe, Donald J.
AU - Morris Coats, R.
AU - Shughart, William F.
AU - Karahan, Gökhan
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 MCRSA. All rights reserved.
Copyright:
Copyright 2017 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2016
Y1 - 2016
N2 - An FBI sting investigation, from 1984 through 1987, called “Operation Pretense” exposed extensive corruption amongst Mississippi’s county supervisors. In response, Mississippi’s legislature asked voters in the November 1988 general election to choose between the then-prevalent “beat system” of county governance and a more centralized “unit system” thought to be less corruption-prone. Voters opted for the unit system in 47 of Mississippi’s 82 counties. We use spatial econometric techniques to examine voter turnout rates in that election. We compare spatial econometric and ordinary least squares models: both reveal that, ceteris paribus, revelations of supervisor corruption influenced voter turnout rates positively at the county level. However, we find no relationship between corruption and voters’ beat-unit choices using spatial econometric techniques — suggesting that voters did not go to the polls to punish corrupt politicians, but were motivated by candidates’ and parties’ greater electioneering efforts to gain access to or to protect corruption rents.
AB - An FBI sting investigation, from 1984 through 1987, called “Operation Pretense” exposed extensive corruption amongst Mississippi’s county supervisors. In response, Mississippi’s legislature asked voters in the November 1988 general election to choose between the then-prevalent “beat system” of county governance and a more centralized “unit system” thought to be less corruption-prone. Voters opted for the unit system in 47 of Mississippi’s 82 counties. We use spatial econometric techniques to examine voter turnout rates in that election. We compare spatial econometric and ordinary least squares models: both reveal that, ceteris paribus, revelations of supervisor corruption influenced voter turnout rates positively at the county level. However, we find no relationship between corruption and voters’ beat-unit choices using spatial econometric techniques — suggesting that voters did not go to the polls to punish corrupt politicians, but were motivated by candidates’ and parties’ greater electioneering efforts to gain access to or to protect corruption rents.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85014770108&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85014770108
VL - 46
SP - 168
EP - 185
JO - Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy
JF - Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy
SN - 1090-4999
IS - 2
ER -