TY - JOUR
T1 - Confirmation dynamics
T2 - A model of presidential appointments to independent agencies
AU - Nokken, Timothy P.
AU - Sala, Brian R.
PY - 2000/1
Y1 - 2000/1
N2 - Many scholars contend that senators defer to the president on appointments to executive branch positions. Others assert that presidential appointments are highly constrained by senatorial 'folkways'. Still others argue that the bureaucracy is essentially uncontrollable via political appointments. In this paper, we present a stylized spatial model of presidential appointments and agency policy-making to explicate the conditions under which senators will constrain presidential appointments to independent agency boards. A key parameter for determining presidential influence is the direction (or absence) of policy drift induced by career bureaucrats' policy preferences. We show that presidential capture of independent agencies follows from favorable bureaucratic drift, but typically does not arise under adverse or zero drift. We illustrate the model via a simulation of appointments over time to an idealized agency board, identifying conditions under which rapid policy convergence on presidential preferences is possible.
AB - Many scholars contend that senators defer to the president on appointments to executive branch positions. Others assert that presidential appointments are highly constrained by senatorial 'folkways'. Still others argue that the bureaucracy is essentially uncontrollable via political appointments. In this paper, we present a stylized spatial model of presidential appointments and agency policy-making to explicate the conditions under which senators will constrain presidential appointments to independent agency boards. A key parameter for determining presidential influence is the direction (or absence) of policy drift induced by career bureaucrats' policy preferences. We show that presidential capture of independent agencies follows from favorable bureaucratic drift, but typically does not arise under adverse or zero drift. We illustrate the model via a simulation of appointments over time to an idealized agency board, identifying conditions under which rapid policy convergence on presidential preferences is possible.
KW - Ideological voting
KW - Independent agencies
KW - Presidential appointments
KW - Spatial models
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0034424367&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1177/0951692800012001004
DO - 10.1177/0951692800012001004
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0034424367
SN - 0951-6298
VL - 12
SP - 91
EP - 112
JO - Journal of Theoretical Politics
JF - Journal of Theoretical Politics
IS - 1
ER -