Competition and monopoly power in local government: An extension of Caplan (2001)

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

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Abstract

Caplan (2001) shows that because land is a source of immobile wealth, local governments can use the property tax to avoid competitive pressures of the Tiebout model, allowing them to deviate from citizens' preferences. In this comment I show that the property tax is not the only tax local governments can use to avoid competitive pressure. Most taxes placed on property owners allow local governments to extract some rents despite perfect citizen mobility.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)353-357
Number of pages5
JournalPublic Choice
Volume120
Issue number3-4
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2004

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