TY - JOUR
T1 - Competition and monopoly power in local government
T2 - An extension of Caplan (2001)
AU - Powell, Benjamin
N1 - Funding Information:
∗ The author thanks Peter Boettke, Bryan Caplan, Tyler Cowen, Charles Rowley, an anonymous referee, and the participants at the Mercatus Center “Brown Bag” for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Financial support from the Mercatus Center is also gratefully acknowledged. Any remaining errors are solely my responsibility.
PY - 2004/9
Y1 - 2004/9
N2 - Caplan (2001) shows that because land is a source of immobile wealth, local governments can use the property tax to avoid competitive pressures of the Tiebout model, allowing them to deviate from citizens' preferences. In this comment I show that the property tax is not the only tax local governments can use to avoid competitive pressure. Most taxes placed on property owners allow local governments to extract some rents despite perfect citizen mobility.
AB - Caplan (2001) shows that because land is a source of immobile wealth, local governments can use the property tax to avoid competitive pressures of the Tiebout model, allowing them to deviate from citizens' preferences. In this comment I show that the property tax is not the only tax local governments can use to avoid competitive pressure. Most taxes placed on property owners allow local governments to extract some rents despite perfect citizen mobility.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=5444238195&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1023/B:PUCH.0000044292.99274.48
DO - 10.1023/B:PUCH.0000044292.99274.48
M3 - Review article
AN - SCOPUS:5444238195
SN - 0048-5829
VL - 120
SP - 353
EP - 357
JO - Public Choice
JF - Public Choice
IS - 3-4
ER -