COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS, CONSTITUENT PREFERENCES, AND CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS

Kevin B. Grier, Michael C. Munger

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

148 Scopus citations

Abstract

We model the behavior of a vote‐maximizing legislator in order to predict interest group campaign contributions to incumbent politicians. We show that committee assignments and voter preferences affect the price a legislator requires to produce policies for any interest group. An econometric analysis of actual interest group contributions shows that these groups make significantly larger contributions to legislators on committees with jurisdiction over especially relevant policy issues and to incumbents with non‐hostile constituencies. These results support our theory; interest groups act as if committees matter in the determination of policy and voters' interests constrain interest group behavior.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)24-43
Number of pages20
JournalEconomic Inquiry
Volume29
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1991

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