Collective bargaining and school district test scores: evidence from Ohio bargaining agreements

Joshua C. Hall, Donald J. Lacombe, Joylynn Pruitt

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle


We revisit the relationship between collective bargaining by teachers unions and school performance. The empirical literature in this area has found mixed results at both the state and district levels. We contribute to this literature in two ways. First, rather than simply dummy union status, we proxy for the restrictiveness of collective bargaining agreements with the number of pages per agreement. Second, we employ Bayesian spatial methods to deal with spatial dependence in school district activities. Our reduced-form results indicate that collective bargaining directly lowers scores on high school math scores, but that the total effect is zero.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)35-38
Number of pages4
JournalApplied Economics Letters
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 2 2017



  • Collective bargaining
  • education production function
  • teachers unions

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