Can a Corrupt Ruling Party Win a Reelection through Vote Buying?

Stephen Devadoss, Jeff Luckstead

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

In many developing countries, it is common for electoral candidates to use embezzled money to buy votes. We develop a dynamic model to analyze the tradeo¤ between economic performance and free handouts resulting from corruption on an incumbent party’s chances of being reelected. The results show, because voters’anticipate handouts from the politicians, politicians engage in corrupt behavior early in the election cycle while minimizing unemployment and maximizing vote buying at the end of the election cycle.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)18-23
JournalApplied Economics
StatePublished - Mar 2016

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