Activists and corporate behavior in food processing and retailing: A sequential bargaining game

Darren Hudson, Jayson Lusk

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

8 Scopus citations

Abstract

This study examines the strategic interaction between food companies and activists using a game theoretic model of sequential bargaining in the absence of complete information. In a rather confined set of circumstances, findings indicate it is always in the best interest of the food company to comply with activists' demands. More frequently, however, there will be cases where compliance is not optimal, depending on the size of the expected effect of protest, cost of defending against protest, and the cost of protest to the activist.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)79-93
Number of pages15
JournalJournal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Volume29
Issue number1
StatePublished - Apr 2004

Keywords

  • Activists
  • Corporate behavior
  • Food industries
  • Sequential bargaining game

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