TY - JOUR
T1 - Active Defense Strategy Selection Method Based on Two-Way Signaling Game
AU - Liu, Xiaohu
AU - Zhang, Hengwei
AU - Zhang, Yuchen
AU - Shao, Lulu
AU - Han, Jihong
AU - Namin, Akbar S.
N1 - Funding Information:
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9446-7426 Liu Xiaohu yudianhappy@126.com 1 2 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1649-7336 Zhang Hengwei wlby_zzmy_henan@163.com 1 2 Zhang Yuchen henan_zlh@163.com 1 2 Shao Lulu luzi1027@139.com 1 Han Jihong 757494820@qq.com 1 2 Namin Akbar S. 1 Zhengzhou Information Science and Technology Institute Zhengzhou 450001 China zznu.edu.cn 2 State Key Laboratory of Mathematical Engineering and Advanced Computing Zhengzhou 450001 China lsec.cc.ac.cn 2019 29 11 2019 2019 23 06 2019 25 09 2019 31 10 2019 29 11 2019 2019 Copyright © 2019 Xiaohu Liu et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License , which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Most network security research studies based on signaling games assume that either the attacker or the defender is the sender of the signal and the other party is the receiver of the signal. The attack and defense process is commonly modeled and analyzed from the perspective of one-way signal transmission. Aiming at the reality of two-way signal transmission in network attack and defense confrontation, we propose a method of active defense strategy selection based on a two-way signaling game. In this paper, a two-way signaling game model is constructed to analyze the network attack and defense processes. Based on the solution of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, a defense strategy selection algorithm is presented. The feasibility and effectiveness of the method are verified using examples from real-world applications. In addition, the mechanism of the deception signal is analyzed, and conclusions for guiding the selection of active defense strategies are provided. National Natural Science Foundation of China 61521003 61572517 Science and Technology Department, Henan Province 182102210144
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Xiaohu Liu et al.
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - Most network security research studies based on signaling games assume that either the attacker or the defender is the sender of the signal and the other party is the receiver of the signal. The attack and defense process is commonly modeled and analyzed from the perspective of one-way signal transmission. Aiming at the reality of two-way signal transmission in network attack and defense confrontation, we propose a method of active defense strategy selection based on a two-way signaling game. In this paper, a two-way signaling game model is constructed to analyze the network attack and defense processes. Based on the solution of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, a defense strategy selection algorithm is presented. The feasibility and effectiveness of the method are verified using examples from real-world applications. In addition, the mechanism of the deception signal is analyzed, and conclusions for guiding the selection of active defense strategies are provided.
AB - Most network security research studies based on signaling games assume that either the attacker or the defender is the sender of the signal and the other party is the receiver of the signal. The attack and defense process is commonly modeled and analyzed from the perspective of one-way signal transmission. Aiming at the reality of two-way signal transmission in network attack and defense confrontation, we propose a method of active defense strategy selection based on a two-way signaling game. In this paper, a two-way signaling game model is constructed to analyze the network attack and defense processes. Based on the solution of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, a defense strategy selection algorithm is presented. The feasibility and effectiveness of the method are verified using examples from real-world applications. In addition, the mechanism of the deception signal is analyzed, and conclusions for guiding the selection of active defense strategies are provided.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85076746602&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1155/2019/1362964
DO - 10.1155/2019/1362964
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85076746602
VL - 2019
JO - Security and Communication Networks
JF - Security and Communication Networks
SN - 1939-0114
M1 - 1362964
ER -