A Wearables-Driven Attack on Examination Proctoring

Tasnia Ashrafi Heya, Abdul Serwadda, Isaac Griswold-Steiner, Richard Matovu

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

Multiple choice questions are at the heart of many standardized tests and examinations at academic institutions allover the world. In this paper, we argue that recent advancements in sensing and human-computer interaction expose these types of questions to highly effective attacks that today's proctor's are simply not equipped to detect. We design one such attack based on a protocol of carefully orchestrated wrist movements combined with haptic and visual feedback mechanisms designed for stealthiness. The attack is done through collaboration between a knowledgeable student (i.e., a mercenary) and a weak student (i.e., the beneficiary) who depends on the mercenary for solutions. Through a combination of experiments and theoretical modeling, we show the attack to be highly effective. The paper makes the case for an outright ban on all tech gadgets inside examination rooms, irrespective of whether their usage appears benign to the plain eye.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2021 18th International Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust, PST 2021
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Electronic)9781665401845
DOIs
StatePublished - 2021
Event18th International Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust, PST 2021 - Auckland, New Zealand
Duration: Dec 13 2021Dec 15 2021

Publication series

Name2021 18th International Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust, PST 2021

Conference

Conference18th International Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust, PST 2021
Country/TerritoryNew Zealand
CityAuckland
Period12/13/2112/15/21

Keywords

  • Gesture-based interaction
  • Wearables

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